O-Minimal Hybrid Reachability Games

In this paper, we consider reachability games over general hybrid systems, and distinguish between two possible observation frameworks for those games: either the precise dynamics of the system is seen by the players (this is the perfect observation framework), or only the starting point and the delays are known by the players (this is the partial observation framework). In the first more classical framework, we show that time-abstract bisimulation is not adequate for solving this problem, although it is sufficient in the case of timed automata . That is why we consider an other equivalence, namely the suffix equivalence based on the encoding of trajectories through words. We show that this suffix equivalence is in general a correct abstraction for games. We apply this result to o-minimal hybrid systems, and get decidability and computability results in this framework. For the second framework which assumes a partial observation of the dynamics of the system, we propose another abstraction, called the superword encoding, which is suitable to solve the games under that assumption. In that framework, we also provide decidability and computability results

When are Stochastic Transition Systems Tameable?

A decade ago, Abdulla, Ben Henda and Mayr introduced the elegant concept of decisiveness for denumerable Markov chains [1]. Roughly speaking, decisiveness allows one to lift most good properties from finite Markov chains to denumerable ones, and therefore to adapt existing verification algorithms to infinite-state models. Decisive Markov chains however do not encompass stochastic real-time systems, and general stochastic transition systems (STSs for short) are needed. In this article, we provide a framework to perform both the qualitative and the quantitative analysis of STSs. First, we define various notions of decisiveness (inherited from [1]), notions of fairness and of attractors for STSs, and make explicit the relationships between them. Then, we define a notion of abstraction, together with natural concepts of soundness and completeness, and we give general transfer properties, which will be central to several verification algorithms on STSs. We further design a generic construction which will be useful for the analysis of {\omega}-regular properties, when a finite attractor exists, either in the system (if it is denumerable), or in a sound denumerable abstraction of the system. We next provide algorithms for qualitative model-checking, and generic approximation procedures for quantitative model-checking. Finally, we instantiate our framework with stochastic timed automata (STA), generalized semi-Markov processes (GSMPs) and stochastic time Petri nets (STPNs), three models combining dense-time and probabilities. This allows us to derive decidability and approximability results for the verification of these models. Some of these results were known from the literature, but our generic approach permits to view them in a unified framework, and to obtain them with less effort. We also derive interesting new approximability results for STA, GSMPs and STPNs.Comment: 77 page

Dynamics and Coalitions in Sequential Games

We consider N-player non-zero sum games played on finite trees (i.e., sequential games), in which the players have the right to repeatedly update their respective strategies (for instance, to improve the outcome wrt to the current strategy profile). This generates a dynamics in the game which may eventually stabilise to a Nash Equilibrium (as with Kukushkin's lazy improvement), and we argue that it is interesting to study the conditions that guarantee such a dynamics to terminate. We build on the works of Le Roux and Pauly who have studied extensively one such dynamics, namely the Lazy Improvement Dynamics. We extend these works by first defining a turn-based dynamics, proving that it terminates on subgame perfect equilibria, and showing that several variants do not terminate. Second, we define a variant of Kukushkin's lazy improvement where the players may now form coalitions to change strategies. We show how properties of the players' preferences on the outcomes affect the termination of this dynamics, and we thereby characterise classes of games where it always terminates (in particular two-player games).Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2017, arXiv:1709.0176

Simple Priced Timed Games Are Not That Simple

Priced timed games are two-player zero-sum games played on priced timed automata (whose locations and transitions are labeled by weights modeling the costs of spending time in a state and executing an action, respectively). The goals of the players are to minimise and maximise the cost to reach a target location, respectively. We consider priced timed games with one clock and arbitrary (positive and negative) weights and show that, for an important subclass of theirs (the so-called simple priced timed games), one can compute, in exponential time, the optimal values that the players can achieve, with their associated optimal strategies. As side results, we also show that one-clock priced timed games are determined and that we can use our result on simple priced timed games to solve the more general class of so-called reset-acyclic priced timed games (with arbitrary weights and one-clock)

Efficient Energy Distribution in a Smart Grid using Multi-Player Games

Algorithms and models based on game theory have nowadays become prominent techniques for the design of digital controllers for critical systems. Indeed, such techniques enable automatic synthesis: given a model of the environment and a property that the controller must enforce, those techniques automatically produce a correct controller, when it exists. In the present paper, we consider a class of concurrent, weighted, multi-player games that are well-suited to model and study the interactions of several agents who are competing for some measurable resources like energy. We prove that a subclass of those games always admit a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a situation in which all players play in such a way that they have no incentive to deviate. Moreover, the strategies yielding those Nash equilibria have a special structure: when one of the agents deviate from the equilibrium, all the others form a coalition that will enforce a retaliation mechanism that punishes the deviant agent. We apply those results to a real-life case study in which several smart houses that produce their own energy with solar panels, and can share this energy among them in micro-grid, must distribute the use of this energy along the day in order to avoid consuming electricity that must be bought from the global grid. We demonstrate that our theory allows one to synthesise an efficient controller for these houses: using penalties to be paid in the utility bill as an incentive, we force the houses to follow a pre-computed schedule that maximises the proportion of the locally produced energy that is consumed.Comment: In Proceedings Cassting'16/SynCoP'16, arXiv:1608.0017